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We evaluate the sensitivity of large, gadolinium-doped water detectors to antineutrinos released
by nuclear fission explosions, using updated signal and background models and taking advantage
of the capacity for seismic observations to provide an analysis trigger. Under certain realistic
conditions, the antineutrino signature of a 250-kiloton pure fission explosion could be identified
several hundred kilometers away in a detector about the size of the largest module currently proposed
for a basic physics experiment. In principle, such an observation could provide rapid confirmation
that the seismic signal coincided with a fission event, possibly useful for international monitoring of
nuclear weapon tests. We discuss the limited potential for seismically-cued antineutrino observations
to constrain fission yield, differentiate pure fission from fusion-enhanced weapon tests, indicate
that the seismic evidence of an explosion had been intentionally masked, or verify the absence of
explosive testing in a targeted area. We conclude that advances in seismic monitoring and neutrino
physics have made the detection of explosion-derived antineutrinos more conceivable than previously
asserted, but the size and cost of sufficiently sensitive detectors continue to limit applications.
I. MOTIVATION
The possibility of detecting antineutrinos from a nu-
clear fission explosion was suggested at least as early as
1951, but such an observation has yet to occur. Plans in
the 1950s [1] and 1980s [2] to employ U.S. weapon tests
in fundamental investigations of neutrinos were discarded
in favor of experiments at nuclear reactors and acceler-
ators. While recent work has explored antineutrinos as
a nonintrusive tool for reactor surveillance (e.g., [3]), the
only publicly available assessment of antineutrino detec-
tion for explosion monitoring is nearly two decades old
[4]. That study evaluated prospects for detecting low-
yield underground or underwater nuclear weapon tests
missed by conventional methods of seismic, infrasound,
hydroacoustic, radionuclide, and satellite-based monitor-
ing. It concluded that the size and cost of antineutrino
detectors able to identify these low-yield explosions ex-
ceeded practical limits at that time.
Large antineutrino detectors remain expensive and
technically demanding, but two advances motivate an up-
dated study. First, progress in basic neutrino physics has
led to the proposal of detectors containing hundreds of
kilotons of gadolinium-doped water in Japan and South
Korea [5, 6]. The proposed detector sites are roughly 600
km and 900 km from the location of the six North Ko-
rean nuclear tests conducted since 2006. This regional
proximity invites questions about whether the detectors
could capture forensically useful signals in the event of a
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future North Korean test. Second, traditional explosion
detection techniques have improved, especially through
the construction of an international seismic network that
now monitors most of the world with a very low detec-
tion threshold [7]. On one hand, this lowered thresh-
old makes detecting subthreshold explosions with an-
tineutrinos even more challenging than at the time of
the previous study. On the other, the fact that the en-
hanced seismic network can now pinpoint suspected det-
onation times and locations opens new possibilities for
antineutrino-based surveillance.
In this work, we consider antineutrino observation as
a complement to established explosion monitoring tech-
niques. Rather than targeting the very small yields ex-
amined in the previous study, we focus on explosions
on the scale of 1 kton to hundreds of kilotons. We as-
sume that a suspected fission event has been observed
through established channels, most likely seismic sens-
ing, and that the probable detonation time and location
have been well constrained by these methods. The es-
timated detonation time, which we call a seismic cue,
indicates when to look for an antineutrino signal in a
detector datastream. This approach directs our atten-
tion to smaller event samples and more realistically sized
detectors than those contemplated in the previous study.
We evaluate sensitivity for two cases of interest. Pri-
marily, we consider the detector size and standoff dis-
tance required to confirm with high confidence that a
seismic signal coincided with a fission event. This confir-
mation could play a role similar to the detection of ra-
dionuclides within the International Monitoring System
overseen by the Preparatory Commission for the Com-
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2prehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization; i.e.,
it could help to formally exclude alternative explanations
of the seismic signal, such as earthquake or chemical ex-
plosion. Compared to radionuclides, antineutrinos have
the advantages of appearing rapidly after an explosion
and escaping from even fully contained underground ex-
plosions. As a secondary objective, we assess how well
antineutrino observations could quantify the fission yield
of an explosion. While the detection conditions would be
very challenging to achieve, the comparison of yield es-
timates from seismic data and antineutrino observations
could, in principle, help to discriminate pure fission from
fusion-enhanced weapon tests, or to indicate that the ex-
plosive energy had been decoupled from the surrounding
earth in an attempt to evade detection.
II. ANTINEUTRINO PRODUCTION FROM A
FISSION EXPLOSION
Electron antineutrinos (ν¯e) are emitted following fis-
sion of heavy nuclei such as 235U and 239Pu when the
neutron-rich fission fragments undergo beta decay. In an
average fission, each of the two fragments decays three
times, leading to the emission of six antineutrinos. One
kiloton of explosive yield (the equivalent of 1 kton of
TNT) corresponds to approximately 1.45 × 1023 fissions
[8] and thus the emission of approximately 8.7 × 1023
antineutrinos from fission fragment decays. As weapon
composition can vary and details are not publicly avail-
able, we base our calculations on a hypothetical highly
enriched uranium, pure fission weapon in which all fis-
sions occur on 235U. Similar calculations can be per-
formed for other nuclei, such as 239Pu. In the case of
239Pu, studies of reactor antineutrino emissions suggest
that the total antineutrino flux would be one third to one
half that of 235U. The main fusion reactions that may be
expected in boosted or thermonuclear weapons [9] do not
produce antineutrinos or neutrinos.
In addition to fission fragment decay, neutron capture
and subsequent beta decays in fission fragments and sur-
rounding material is an expected source of antineutri-
nos following a fission explosion. We do not model this
contribution, since it depends on details of the weapon
and environment. Including it in our model would in-
crease the antineutrino flux expected for a given fission
yield, but probably only modestly since the number of
beta decays initiated in this way cannot be much larger
than the number of fissions, and many of the emitted an-
tineutrinos would be below detection threshold. Other
features of fission explosions are less significant for the
analysis presented here. Lorentz boosting of antineutri-
nos, even for fast-moving fragments in an explosion, has
a negligible effect on the energy spectrum. Detections
are likely to occur far enough from an explosion site that
the underground explosion cavity can be approximated
as a pointlike source.
Only approximate, one-dimensional estimates of the
time and energy dependence of antineutrino emission
from an explosion have so far been presented in the open
literature [4]. More attention has focused on the related
case of antineutrinos produced in low-enriched uranium-
fueled light-water-moderated fission reactors, which have
been well measured in the context of neutrino oscillation
measurements. We expect the energy spectrum of an-
tineutrinos from a uranium- or plutonium-fueled fission
explosion to be generally similar to reactor antineutrino
emissions, with some differences due to the harder fis-
sioning neutron spectrum in the explosion case. The time
profile will be significantly different, with a rapidly de-
caying pulse in the case of an explosion versus the quasi-
steady-state emission from a reactor.
For this study, we model the time and energy depen-
dence of the antineutrino emission from a hypothetical
uranium-fueled, pure fission explosion based on the fol-
lowing assumptions and approximations: all fissions oc-
cur on 235U within a microsecond of detonation [10]; the
fission-inducing neutron spectrum is unmoderated (the
Watt spectrum [11]); all antineutrinos are produced by
the beta decays of fission fragments and their daughters
(neglecting neutron activation, as noted above); transi-
tions from excited beta end states to the ground state
are essentially instantaneous (the small population of iso-
mers is neglected); and all beta decays have the simple
allowed spectrum shape used in early reactor spectrum
estimates [12]. We neglect corrections to the beta spec-
trum shape since detailed energy spectrum information
is not relevant for our sensitivity analyses.
Following these assumptions, we perform a Monte
Carlo simulation of the beta decay chains of fission frag-
ments. We begin with simulations of the instantaneous
fission fragment yield from 235U by neutrons with ki-
netic energies of 2.0 MeV, the approximate mean of the
Watt spectrum, supplied by the freya simulation pack-
age [13]. We simulate the beta decays of these frag-
ments, and their daughters, until stability is reached, us-
ing data on half-lives, branching ratios, and endpoints ex-
tracted from the Evaluated Nuclear Structure Data File
(ENSDF) database [14]. The ENSDF database is not
entirely comprehensive, and we simply omit antineutrino
emission from beta decays for which half-life or endpoint
information is not available. Other nuclear databases
could be substituted for ENSDF and the freya results,
but given the approximations listed in the previous para-
graph and the fact that we do not use detailed spectrum
information in our ultimate calculations, the choice of
database will have minimal impact on our conclusions.
To benchmark our simulation, we use our model to
estimate the energy spectrum from a thermal reactor
at equilibrium. We compare this estimate to a more
carefully modeled thermal reactor spectrum commonly
used in neutrino oscillation studies [15]. Figure 1 in-
cludes both of these thermal spectrum estimates. Our
estimated spectrum is somewhat harder than the refer-
ence spectrum, likely due to differences between our basic
beta-branch summation method and the electron spec-
3trum conversion method used for the reference. In the
energy range relevant for detection (above the threshold
marked in Fig. 1, our spectrum includes about 10% fewer
antineutrinos than the reference spectrum, likely due to
holes in the ENSDF database. We find these differences
acceptable for the present study, since detailed spectrum
shape information is not important for our study and un-
derestimating the antineutrino flux would only make our
sensitivity estimates more conservative.
The main result of our simulation is a two-dimensional
model of antineutrino emission from a hypothetical 235U
explosion, as a function of energy and time since detona-
tion. A clear feature is the anticorrelation between emis-
sion time and energy expected for an ensemble of beta
decays, with higher-energy antineutrinos tending to ap-
pear at shorter times. The one-dimensional projection in
Fig. 2 emphasizes the long tail of this distribution along
the time axis. When all energies are considered, only
about 30% of antineutrinos are emitted within 10 sec-
onds of detonation. However, most of the delayed emis-
sions are below currently achievable detection thresholds.
For antineutrinos with energies above 1.8 MeV (the en-
ergy threshold of the inverse beta decay detection channel
discussed in Sec. III), about 60% of the flux is emitted
within 10 seconds of detonation.
Figure 1 shows the simulated energy spectrum of
all antineutrinos emitted in the hypothetical explosion,
along with the energy spectrum of only those antineu-
trinos emitted within the first 10 seconds following det-
onation. As noted above, this figure also includes our
estimate of antineutrino emission from 235U in a ther-
mal reactor at equilibrium. The total fission explosion
spectrum is harder than the equilibrium thermal reac-
tor spectrum. Further study would be needed to de-
termined whether this difference is due primarily to the
different energies of fission-inducing neutrons or the dif-
ferent abundances of beta decaying isotopes in a fission
burst as compared to a reactor at equilibrium. More im-
portantly for this analysis, the spectrum of antineutrinos
emitted within the first 10 seconds of detonation has a
considerably higher mean energy than that of the total
emission, consistent with the energy-time anti-correlation
noted above.
Based on the roughly 10% normalization difference be-
tween our thermal spectrum model and the more precise
reference, along with the difference in spectral shape,
we estimate that systematic uncertainties on our sim-
ulated fission explosion spectrum are of the order of 10-
20% in the most relevant energy bins. This envelope
is larger than the few-percent uncertainties on reactor
antineutrino spectra calculated from reactor core simu-
lations and nuclear databases. Our basic emission model
could be improved through additional input from nuclear
databases and more precise beta spectrum shape treat-
ment similar to reactor analyses, but this level of preci-
sion suffices for the present discussion.
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FIG. 1. The simulated energy spectrum of antineutrinos emit-
ted from a 235U fission explosion, in total (light blue) and in
only the first 10 seconds after detonation (dark blue). Over-
laid are two estimates for antineutrino emissions from 235U
fissions in a thermal reactor under equilibrium conditions:
the estimate from our basic beta-branch summation model
(solid black line) and one from a more sophisticated electron
spectrum conversion model commonly used in neutrino oscil-
lation studies [15] (dashed black line). The vertical dotted
line marks the IBD threshold of 1.8 MeV, and the IBD cross
section appears as a solid curve, shown here with arbitrary
units.
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FIG. 2. The simulated time profile of antineutrinos emitted
from a 235U fission explosion, normalized to one fission, for
antineutrinos of all energies (light blue) and only for antineu-
trinos above the IBD threshold of 1.8 MeV (dark blue). The
vertical dotted line marks 10 seconds post-detonation, the
cutoff time for signals considered in this analysis.
4III. OBSERVATION IN A SEISMICALLY-CUED
WATER-BASED DETECTOR
Currently, the most feasible detection channel for an-
tineutrinos from a fission explosion is the inverse beta
decay (IBD) reaction, commonly used to detect antineu-
trinos from nuclear reactors: ν¯e + p→ e+ + n. Coherent
elastic neutrino-nucleus scattering has a higher cross sec-
tion on neutron-rich targets, but as discussed in Sec. VII,
technology capable of detecting its signature for antineu-
trinos below 10 MeV is still under development.
Proton-rich detector media such as water and
hydrocarbon-based liquid scintillator, instrumented with
photomultiplier tubes or other light collectors, are ideal
for IBD detection. While scintillator offers better detec-
tion efficiency and energy resolution, cost and environ-
mental constraints make water a more practical choice
for the large detector masses demanded in this applica-
tion. Doping water with the gadolinium, which has been
successfully demonstrated [16], makes IBD events much
more identifiable. These events create a double flash of
prompt Cherenkov light from the positron track, followed
within a few tens of microseconds by a gamma cascade
arising from neutron capture on Gd.
Few other classes of events mimic the distinctive de-
layed coincidence signature of IBD interactions. Ac-
cidental coincidences of ambient radioactivity, cosmic-
muon-generated fast neutron scatterings and captures,
and cosmic-ray-produced beta-neutron emitters are the
main non-antineutrino backgrounds. Their rates can be
minimized by choosing radiopure detector materials and
siting the detector deep underground. For weapon test
monitoring, IBD interactions of reactor antineutrinos and
geoneutrinos (antineutrinos produced by natural radioac-
tivity in the earth) are also backgrounds. Their rates
vary by geographic location, according to reactor prox-
imity and local geology [17].
One strategy for distinguishing a fission explosion sig-
nal from backgrounds is to require the signal to include
many events in a short time window, such as ten events
in 10 seconds, a grouping unlikely to occur by random co-
incidence of backgrounds. This strategy was the basis for
the previous study of antineutrinos as a nuclear weapon
monitor [4]. The same technique is used to search for neu-
trino bursts from supernovae (which are in some sense a
background for nuclear weapon test monitoring but not
a real limitation, as sufficiently nearby supernovae occur
rarely enough that the antineutrino flux is far below the
flux from reactors and terrestrial radioactivity).
It is not necessary to require coincidence of many
events if an external trigger, or time cue, can identify
the window in which the signal should occur. If the win-
dow is short enough, the expected background count will
be very close to zero and any observed events are likely to
be signal, with a likelihood that can be easily quantified.
For a suspected nuclear weapon test, the estimated deto-
nation time derived from seismic observations provides an
external trigger. We envision this trigger being applied
at the analysis level to data that has been continuously
recorded above a minimum signal threshold, as is typi-
cal for reactor neutrino detectors. We call this technique
seismic cuing. The principle is similar to the common
technique of requiring a beam trigger in accelerator-based
experiments. It exploits the pulse-like time structure that
inspired the original consideration of a fission explosion
as an antineutrino source in the 1950s.
For suspected nuclear tests of a few kilotons or more,
the detonation time can generally be inferred from seis-
mic data to within approximately 2 s [18]. The length
of the seismically cued signal window can be optimized
for specific background levels, expected signal strength
and standoff distance, and the available cuing precision.
Optimization would balance the increased absolute sig-
nal rate in a longer window against the decreased signal-
to-background ratio. Throughout this study, we use a
10 s window as a demonstration. This window is large
enough to contain most of the observable antineutrino
flux, according to Sec. II, and significantly longer than
the expected uncertainty on a seismic cue. According to
simple optimization studies, 10 seconds is close to the
optimal time window for the detection efficiency, back-
ground rates, yields, standoff distances, and detection
criteria used in this study. While choosing a window
shorter than 10 seconds would clearly increase the signal-
to-background ratio, given the time structure of Fig. 2,
the loss in absolute signal rate would result in an overall
degradation of the sensitivity shown in Fig. 3. Again,
we note that a window length shorter or longer than 10
seconds may be optimal for efficiency, background, and
standoff conditions different from the nominal cases we
consider.
In a real application, the window would likely be
opened a few seconds before the cue time to account
for uncertainty in the seismic analysis. For simplicity,
this study assumes that the cue occurs exactly at the
time of detonation. The antineutrino transit time from
source to detector, of the order of milliseconds or less
for the distances we consider, is negligible in this analy-
sis. Selecting the desired time window from a neutrino
dataset is straightforward. Near-real-time analysis tech-
niques developed for supernova triggers [19] suggest that
data could be processed and analyzed almost as soon as
a seismic time cue is available, likely before radionuclide
analysis would be available to confirm the presence of
fission.
IV. ESTIMATION OF OBSERVABLE SIGNAL
Using the signal simulation described in Sec. II, and
following the detection scheme outlined in Sec. III, the
number N of antineutrinos that could be detected from
a fission explosion of yield Y kton in a Gd-doped water
detector of fiducial mass M located a distance L from
the explosion site (L is the chord connecting these points
through the earth, not the great circle distance on the
5Detector Signal Event counts in 10 s
Fiducial mass
(tons)
Depth
(mwe)
Nearby
reactors
Distance from ex-
plosion (km)
Fission yield
(kton)
Signal ν¯e Total
bkgd.
1.9× 105 2200 Many 600 250 2.3 0.7
5.0× 105 2200 Many 900 250 2.5 1.3
5.0× 105 2200 Few 200 10 2.5 1.3
1.0× 103 270 None 10 10 2.9 < 0.1
TABLE I. Estimated signal and background counts in a Gd-doped water Cherenkov detector, within a seismically cued 10 s
window, for selected scenarios of detector mass, detector depth in meters water equivalent (mwe), prevalence of nuclear reactors
in the region, distance from explosion to detector, and yield of fission explosion in kilotons.
earth’s surface, but these are negligibly different for dis-
tances of up to 1000 km) is as follows:
N =
pMNA
A
fY η
4piL2
×
∫ ∞
E0
dE
∫ t0+∆t
t0
dt S(E,L)φ(E, t)σ(E) (1)
In this expression, p = 2 is the number of free protons
(hydrogen nuclei) per water molecule; NA is Avogadro’s
constant; A is the molar mass of water; f = 1.45×1023 is
the number of fissions per kiloton of explosive yield; η is
the detection efficiency for IBD events, discussed below;
E is the antineutrino energy; E0 = 1.8 MeV is the IBD
threshold; t is the time of antineutrino emission, inte-
grated from the suspected detonation time t0 for a signal
window of length ∆t; S is the probability that an ini-
tially electron-flavored antineutrino of energy Eν will be
detectable in electron flavor after traveling the distance
L, calculated using current global fits for neutrino flavor
oscillation parameters [20] (we neglect any possible oscil-
lation to sterile neutrino states); φ is the simulated an-
tineutrino flux; and σ is the IBD cross section, for which
we use a standard parametrization [21, 22].
The detection efficiency parameter η includes the ra-
tio of detector livetime to total time in ∆t, accounting
for cosmic muon vetoes and any other deadtime, and the
efficiency of all IBD selection cuts. For this study, we
estimate that muon veto deadtime leads to an efficiency
factor of 0.9, achievable with the detector depths and
geometries that we envision. Deadtime from electronics
and other factors is assumed to be negligible. The effi-
ciency of large Gd-doped water detectors to IBD events
below 10 MeV has not yet been experimentally studied,
so we work from simulations performed by the WATCH-
MAN collaboration for a kiloton-scale detector with 0.1%
Gd loading and 40% photocathode coverage, optimized
for reactor antineutrino observation. These simulations
indicate that signal detection efficiency of 65% is achiev-
able at the price of relatively high accidental-coincidence
backgrounds [23]. For our central value signal estima-
tions, we use a more conservative 50% signal detection
efficiency over the range 1.8 MeV < Eν < 10 MeV, ap-
proximated as energy-independent. Achieving this effi-
ciency for volumes much larger than the WATCHMAN
scale of 1 kton may require detector segmentation, in-
creased photocathode coverage, or other enhancements.
Table I lists estimates for the number of observable an-
tineutrinos in various scenarios of detector mass, depth,
proximity to reactors, and distance from explosions of
selected yields.
V. SENSITIVITY FOR IDENTIFYING FISSION
EXPLOSIONS
Depending on background levels, observation of an-
tineutrino interactions in a seismically cued signal win-
dow could provide a statistically credible answer to the
question: Did the source of the suspect seismic signal
involve nuclear fission? We quantify antineutrino-based
sensitivity to this question with a simple hypothesis test
based on counting statistics. The null hypothesis includes
only background events. The alternative hypothesis in-
cludes both background and an antineutrino signal from
a fission explosion. This test neglects systematic uncer-
tainties on background rates, but we expect that these
could be constrained to a level well below statistical un-
certainties. We also leave out specific timing and energy
information, as well as the weak, stochastic directional-
ity information available for an ensemble of IBD events
in water, as these would likely have minimal effect on
sensitivity in small-signal scenarios.
We perform this hypothesis test for a variety of ex-
plosive yields, detector-to-explosion distances, detector
sizes, detector depths, and regional locations. To pre-
dict signal counts, we use Eq. 1. To predict counts
from accidental, fast neutron, and cosmogenic isotope
backgrounds, we scale estimates made by the WATCH-
MAN collaboration [24]. To be conservative, we use back-
ground rates estimated for relatively loose selection cuts.
We scale these rates by detector volume, or surface area
in the case of radioactive contaminants in photomulti-
plier tubes, and we scale muon-induced backgrounds ac-
cording to muon rate and energy variation with detector
depth [25, 26]. We estimate the reactor antineutrino and
geoneutrino background by choosing representative loca-
tions on a worldwide map of expected flux from both
sources [17].
Figure 3 is one way to represent sensitivity to posi-
6tively identifying fission explosions. The figure indicates
the size of a 2200-mwe underground, Gd-doped water
detector that would be required to achieve at least 90%
probability of positively identifying a fission event at 99%
confidence level or greater, as a function of detector dis-
tance from the explosion site, for four different explo-
sive yields. The central value curves assume 50% sig-
nal detection efficiency and the background scaled from
WATCHMAN as noted above. The bands cover scenarios
ranging from 40% to 60% signal detection efficiency and
backgrounds from 0.2 to 5 times the background rates
scaled from WATCHMAN. The step discontinuities in
these curves come from the small numbers of discrete
signal events required in low-background scenarios. For
example, the discontinuity just below the WATCHMAN
line corresponds to the jump from needing one observed
event to reach the desired confidence level to needing
two events. Note that the scenarios of greatest interest
involve detection of two or more events. The smooth
waves come from flavor oscillations. Indicated in this
figure are the fiducial masses typically quoted for the
largest existing neutrino detector (Super Kamiokande,
with a fiducial volume of 22.5 kilotons for most analy-
ses), the largest proposed detector (one of the two tanks
for Hyper-Kamiokande, with a proposed fiducial mass of
190 kilotons) [27], and a more moderately sized detector
proposed for reactor monitoring (WATCHMAN, with a
fiducial mass of 1 kiloton).
Under our central value model, in over 90% of cases
a detector the size of one proposed Hyper-Kamiokande
tank (190 kilotons fiducial) would observe enough an-
tineutrino events to positively identify, at greater than
90% confidence level, a pure fission explosion of 250 kilo-
tons occurring up to 450 km away. In over 80% of cases,
a detector of this size could identify a 250-kton explo-
sion with at least 85% confidence at a distance of up to
600 km. Estimates of the fission yield of North Korean
nuclear test in September 2017 vary widely, with many
around 250 kilotons [28–30], with no definitive statements
about the fraction occurring from fission. The sites pro-
posed for a Hyper-Kamiokande detector in South Korea
are about 600 km from the North Korean nuclear test
site, so if this detector had already been built and was
operating, it may have had an opportunity to rapidly con-
firm that the September 2017 seismic event involved nu-
clear fission. Detectors on the scale of the largest existing
detector, Super-Kamiokande, would have a high proba-
bility of confirming fission explosions at closer range, in-
cluding distances up to slightly over 100 kilometers for
large yields.
Detectors of a more moderate size, similar to the scale
of WATCHMAN, would have a high probability of pos-
itively identifying fission explosions down to about 10
kton of yield within about 10 km. An application for
this capability could be deployment of kiloton-scale de-
tectors in specific sensitive areas to demonstrate that fis-
sion explosions were not occurring there, at least above
the relatively large yield threshold of 10 kton. For ex-
ample, as part of a cooperative monitoring agreement,
a nation could construct a detector on a former nuclear
test site. Seismic activity in that area could be checked
against the antineutrino data stream, possibly reducing
the need for on-site inspections in an area which may still
be active for reasons other than nuclear testing.
For all of these cases, we note that the detector size re-
quired for meaningful sensitivity is smaller than that sug-
gested in previous, low-yield-focused work [4] but proba-
bly still too large to be widely deployable. As a rough cost
scale, the Super-Kamiokande detector required about
$100 million to construct in the 1990s [31]. The cost
per ton for a Gd-doped detector with high photocathode
coverage, built today, would likely be higher.
VI. SENSITIVITY TO FISSION YIELD
Since the number of antineutrinos emitted in a fission
explosion is directly proportional to the number of fis-
sions, a measurement of antineutrino flux provides a con-
straint on the explosive yield from fission. More specif-
ically, the constraint is on the factor S(L)Y/L2, but for
simplicity we assume that L is perfectly known from seis-
mic data. Depending on proximity to seismic sensors,
explosion epicenters generally can be well inferred [18].
We quantify sensitivity for yield measurements based
on simple counting statistics, as in the previous section.
Again, we neglect systematic uncertainties on the signal
model, since statistical uncertainty dominates and sys-
tematics could likely be reduced by more rigorous mod-
eling. Tightly constraining yield estimates requires more
antineutrino events than merely confirming that some fis-
sion occurred, making detector masses requirements for
strong yield constraints larger than those identified in the
previous section.
Table II shows the most probable 68% confidence level
interval on a fission yield measurement for two example
scenarios: a relatively high-yield explosion observed from
a relatively long distance and a smaller yield observed
from a shorter distance, both in a megaton-scale detector
(where most probable interval means the interval derived
in the case where the mean expected number of events is
observed). These intervals are of a similar magnitude to
uncertainties reported on some seismic yield estimates,
which are limited by uncertainties about the test site ge-
ology and configuration, particularly uncertainty on the
underground depth of the explosion [32].
Antineutrino-based yield measurements may be most
useful in cases where they disagree significantly with
yield estimates from seismic data or other observations
based on ground movement, such as radio interferometry.
An antineutrino-based yield estimate that is significantly
larger than the apparent seismic yield could indicate that
the test site cavity had been engineered to reduce explo-
sive energy coupling to the surrounding earth. Estimates
suggest that well-engineered cavity decoupling could re-
duce the apparent yield of a test, as inferred from seismic
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FIG. 3. The fiducial mass of a Gd-doped water detector required to achieve at least 90% probability of positively identifying a
fission event at 99% or higher confidence level, as a function of detector distance from the explosion site, for varying fission yields
in kilotons (kton). Central value estimates (solid blue curves) are based on 50% signal detection efficiency and background
rates scaled from WATCHMAN simulations, assuming a detector depth of 2200 meters water equivalent and many nearby
reactors; these conditions match the first two rows in Tab. I. Bands (shaded blue) cover signal detection efficiency ranging
from 40% to 60% and background rates ranging from 0.2 times to 5 times the central value estimates. The standard fiducial
mass of the largest existing neutrino detector (Super-Kamiokande, 22.5 kilotons), one tank of the largest proposed detector
(Hyper-Kamiokande, 190 kilotons), and a moderately sized detector proposed for reactor monitoring (WATCHMAN, 1 kiloton)
are superimposed (orange-brown lines).
Distance from explosion
to detector (km)
True yield of fission
explosion (kton)
Most probable 68% CL interval for
ν¯-based yield measurement (kton)
600 250 170–330
200 50 40–60
TABLE II. The most probable 68% confidence level (CL) intervals on an antineutrino-derived measurement of explosive yield
from fission for various scenarios of detector fiducial mass, distance from an explosion, and true fission yield in kilotons, based
on statistical uncertainty only. The detector is a 1 megaton fiducial, Gd-doped water Cherenkov detector with moderate
backgrounds, as estimated for a detector located at a depth of 2200 meters water equivalent in a region with many reactors.
data, by a factor of up to 70 for yields up to a kiloton and
10-20 for some higher yields [33]. As Tab. II indicates, a
suitably sized and positioned antineutrino detector may
be capable of measuring yield in this range with an er-
ror much smaller than a factor of 10. In such cases, as
long as seismic yield estimates are reasonably precise, an
antineutrino measurement could be an indicator of de-
coupling.
In principle, an antineutrino measurement that is sig-
nificantly lower than a well-constrained seismic yield es-
timate could indicate that some fraction of the explosive
yield came from fusion rather than fission. As noted in
Sec. II, the main fusion reactions expected in weapons
do not produce neutrinos or antineutrinos. A deficit in
antineutrinos, compared to the expectation from a seis-
mic yield estimate, could therefore be evidence that the
source event was not a pure fission event. It would be
very difficult to discriminate between pure fission and
fusion-boosted fission devices, in which the fusion reac-
tions serve primarily to provide fission-inducing neutrons
rather than to directly increase yield [9]. Differentiating
pure or boosted fission devices from thermonuclear de-
vices would be more feasible, as the latter may obtain up
to about half their explosive yield directly from fusion
[9].
The above discussion is, of course, somewhat idealized.
We give separate discussions of seismic decoupling (which
reduces the seismic signal, relative to the antineutrino
signal) and fusion-enhanced devices (which increase the
seismic signal, relative to the antineutrino signal), but
8these effects could occur together in the same scenario,
adding some ambiguity to the joint interpretation of seis-
mic and antineutrino data, especially in low-signal situ-
ations. Additional ambiguity comes from the fact that
different fission fuel compositions produce antineutrino
rates varying by up to about 40% [12]. Thus, the anal-
yses we discuss would be most definitive in cases where
certain other facts are known. For example, a country
may be known to have no sites suitable for seismically
decoupled tests, or known to possess capabilities for ura-
nium enrichment but not plutonium production. In any
case, the antineutrino signal carries information distinct
from the seismic data and can therefore provide further
insight, as long as the seismic and antineutrino signals
are measured with sufficient precision.
VII. ALTERNATIVE ANTINEUTRINO
DETECTION TECHNOLOGIES
We focus on IBD detection in monolithic Gd-doped
water Cherenkov detectors as the most technically ma-
ture option for observing antineutrinos from fission explo-
sions. Some potential enhancements and alternative de-
tection channels merit brief discussion. The detection ef-
ficiency of a Gd-doped water detector could be increased
with use of a water-based liquid scintillator and more ad-
vanced light collection systems, both under development
[34, 35]. At most, these enhancements could improve fis-
sion confirmation and yield sensitivity by about a factor
of two, since the main limitation in our present analy-
ses is raw number of signal events rather than detection
efficiency.
Coherent elastic (anti)neutrino-nucleus scattering is an
alternative detection channel which could increase the
number of raw signal events substantially, compared to
IBD detection. This process was recently observed for
the first time [36] with neutrinos of higher energy than
those from a fission explosion and with a more clearly ex-
ploitable time signature. Technology capable of detect-
ing fission-produced antineutrinos is under development
(e.g., [37]). Coherent scattering detectors would observe
more signal events per unit mass than IBD detectors,
but this potential should be balanced against the expec-
tation that viable detector media, such as cryogenic noble
elements and bolometric crystals, are less scalable than
water.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
We present a simple model for the time- and energy-
dependent emission of antineutrinos from a hypotheti-
cal 235U fission weapon. Using this model, and using
reasonable assumptions about detection efficiency and
backgrounds, we estimate the size of Gd-doped water de-
tectors required to confirm that a suspect seismic signal
coincided with a fission event. We have also explore sensi-
tivity for antineutrino-based fission yield measurements,
which in some extreme cases could identify seismically
decoupled explosions or distinguish pure fission weapons
from weapons with a significant fraction of energy from
fusion. In general, the main limit on sensitivity is the
raw number of signal events, with detection efficiency
and background rates being less critical limitations.
Overall, we show that antineutrino-based nuclear
weapon test monitoring has broader potential than pre-
viously suggested but remains at the edge of conceivable
detection capabilities. In our view, it remains challenging
to envision building very large-scale detectors specifically
for this purpose. However, nuclear test monitoring or test
ban verification could be considerations in the siting, de-
sign, or operation of detectors built primarily for basic
physics, particularly as these detectors grow in size and
capabilities.
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